DIANM 2-77 DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM ae te men eee emer crrteemmmmemoemren re oe ’ . * - os - -PRC STRATEGIC ATTACK - FORCES (U) Weems eee ee ewes Ae pvene oe camer temmmmmetnt rece = DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM PRC STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES (U) This Memorandum has not been coordinated with the Service Intelligence Chiefs. APPROVED BY: ON JAMES A. WILLIAMS Brigadier General, USA Deputy Director for Estimates &Ag DIANM 2-77 6 June 1977 ED BY DIA-DE -SEGREF——— DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYTICAL MEMORANDUM PRC STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES (U) This memorandum analyzes the factors behind the slow progress of PRC si, strategic missile programs. Near-term uncertainties in these programs are highlighted, and estimates of likely outcomes are provided. The implications of fong-term forecasts of PRC strategic forces are discussed. ieee Sa Oe ae Ae et ee te A (b)(3) (Note: Comments and/or questions concerning this Analytical Memorandum should be referred o aaa China/Far East Division, Directorate for Estimates, OX4-5984,) 14ii (Reverse Blank) SECRET —SECRET— THE ESTIMATE China's Perception of the Threat 18} China's strategic weapon programs have proceeded at a slow pace when compared to US or Soviet programs. This has been largely a result of interacting political, economic, technological, and military factors. Of these, the PRC's evolving ign perception of the military threat to its national interests and well-being has been a prime determinant in the selection and development of strategic weapons. The nature, extent, and timing of the deployment of nuclear forces, as well as the ., weapons now in development, appear to mirror the Chinese perceptions of threats to their security. 2.%S8k In the early 1950's, when the Chinese considered the United States to be the main enemy, the PRC began to develop nuclear weapon systems with the aid of its Soviet ally. China first focused on developing a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM}. {t was to serve, in large part, as a technical beginning for their apparent goal of an intercontinental ballistic missile (1CBM)} capable: of reaching targets in the United States. (by(1) “" per CIA ie o a in the Chinese view, nuclear forces are to prevent the “nuclear blackmail" of China. 4.8). After the split with the Soviets, the Chinese apparently decided to push for development of a variety of strategic nuclear weapon systems of gradually increasing capabilities. These were to serve both as a psychological factor enhancing the image of PRC power and as an effective, if limited, deterrent. In the late 1960's, priority was placed on developing a theater nuclear force which could deter the Soviets and also counter any US threat from Southeast Asia. The initial missile deployment pattern of MRBMs and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) -- CSS-1s and CSS-2s -- in the late 1960's and early 1970's provided coverage of such potential targets as invading Soviet troops, Soviet armed forces od and cities to the north and east, and US forces and alfies to the east and south (Figure 1). Increasingly, the embyronic nuclear force structure focused on a theater capability; weapon systems included the CSS-1, CSS-2, TU-16/BADGER ‘ intermediate-range bomber, and probably the {!L-28/BEAGLE medium-range bomber, and F-S/FANTAN fighter-bomber. b)(1) a |: ERE tad CSS-2 (2,700 Kro} FIGURE 1. INITIAL STRATEGIC MISSILE DEPLOYMENT 2 -SECGRET SEGRE 5. tS) Although the Chinese were working on {CBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the late 1960's, these weapon programs apparently had tess priority than the shorter range systems. During the 1970's, the potential threat from the United States has decreased even further in the minds of the Chinese. While the Soviets continue to be the major threat to the Chinese, their view of the likelihood of hostilities has decreased significantly. This perception of the threat has contributed to the slow pace of long-range strategic programs. Economic and Technical Factors 6.6). Economic. -- Just as the strategic context indicates who and where the main enemy is, economic resource constraints delimit weapon system availability and force sizing in China. There are a multitude of military and civil requirements competing for China's extremely limited national resources. The Chinese have placed first priority on the civil sector to enable their economy to grow. Thus, the resources available for military needs have been doubly constrained. The investment burden and unit costs of strategic weaponry far exceed individual conventional programs. Nevertheless, overriding security requirements caused China to begin development of nuclear weaponry even though she could ill afford them. Moreover, since the beginning of their strategic program, the Chinese have shielded the effort from the adverse effect of periods of turbulence in their society: while the emphasis placed on conventional forces has fluctuated considerably over time, the priority on strategic forces has remained relatively constant. Economic realities may have deflated, or at least stretched-out, Chinese plans for more extensive strategic nuclear forces, but a modest nuclear deterrent capability was deemed economically attainable and they have set about to acquire it. 7.8)\.Continued scarcity of skilled manpower and critical equipment and materials has adversely impacted on Chinese strategic weapon system development. Past educational disruptions have and will continue to aggravate the shortage of manpower necessary to move through the difficult process of weapon system research, development, test, and evaluation into a meaningful production capability. The Chinese apparently only have the resources to support a limited number of high technology programs at any’ given time and even these programs may experience skilled manpower and equipment deficiencies. Sderynrie (b)(1) 8. 487 Technical. - The Chinese have encountered major technical difficulties on several of their indigenous strategic programs -- for exampie, their long-range {CBM, the CSS-X-4, Preliminary design and feasibility studies for this system Started in the early 1960's; and it appeared the missile could reach an initial operational capability (IOC) in the 1970 time frame. Technical difficulties, primarily in the propulsion system, contributed to. extensive delays and early failures in the flight test program. After an initial successful ballistic flight in 1970, the next four flights over some four years were failures. The Chinese have apparently solved most of the technical problems with this missile as it has become a relatively reliable space booster (five out of six space launches since 1975 have been successful). The missile, however, has not been tested in a surface-to-surface mode since 1971. We now estimate that the system will not reach operational status as an 1CBM before 1980, some 10 years tater than first estimated. 9. —*8iTechnical problems in the Chinese _ ballistic-missile-firing, nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN) program also appear to have significantly lengthened development time. The HAN nuclear-powered attack submarine was launched in 1971, but has been plagued with troubles — probably related to the nuclear propulsion system -- and has yet to reach a reliable operational status. The difficulties encountered with the HAN apparently have had a ripple effect an the slow development of the Chinese SSBNs. We believe SSBNs have been under construction for some time, but the expected launch dates are long past. There appears to be little effort to expedite construction, probably because of unresolved technical difficutties with the submarine nuclear power plant. BYRINY FIGURE 3. THE HAN 10-™_S}-The SLBM program also appears to be encountering technical problems, although there may be some coupling of slippage between the SLBM and the SSBN. The SLBM apparently uses solid propellants. In 1967, a Chinese solid-propellant missile production facility became operational, but a decade later not a single stage of an offensive solid-propellant missile has been flight tested. A dummy SLBM has been surface tested extensively over the past several years, including pop-up tests and submarine compatibility. tests, but the missile has not yet been flown. Since the PRC is continuing to invest extensively in solid-propellant production facilities, the Chinese apparently stilt plan to field missiles of this type despite past difficulties. It originally appeared that the SLBM could reach [OC in the mid-1970's; we now estimate the early 1980's. ‘mpact on Strategic Forces 1 TNS) China's perception of the threat, economic constraints, and technical difficulties have combined to yield a glacial developmental pace for long-range strategic programs and deployment of only a modest theater nuclear force. The major investment in scarce resources and facilities devoted to nuclear weapon system . programs suggest that the Chinese must have initially intended to build a force both larger, and of longer range. Two primary factors coalesced in the late 1960's and early 1970's to change Chinese plans. First, the USSR replaced the United States as the primary and most immediate threat, as relations with the United States and the West in general improved. Second, technical problems with Jonger-range strategic systems arose as Peking attempted to develop its own systems, rather than use hardware based on Soviet systems. These two developments, combined with economic constraints, led to an adjustment downward in Chinese strategic force sizing. 5 —SEGREF— CSS3ICBM - : CSS-1 MRBM a . CSS-2 IRBM toc Range tkm) Yietd (b)C1 ) CEP (km) Propefiants Noe? Starable Liquid Storable Liquid Deployment — Field/Permanent Field/Permanent - Silo FIGURE 4. OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC MISSILES (b)(1) —SEEGREF- 12 TShin view of the present climate of international relations and the adequacy of the existing theater nuclear force deterrent, we believe the Chinese do not see an urgent need to deploy jarge numbers of first-generation, long-range, Strategic systems. Nevertheless, to perform as a major power in the international arena, the PRC needs enough strategic nuclear forces to ensure the survivability, flexibility, and effectiveness of a minimal retaliatory capability against all potential adversaries, including the United States. T3-™%SLSince the passing of Mao, the leadership of China has been debating policy options and the outcome is not clear. The general direction of national policies and, in particular, strategic programs is, however, not expected to change radically. All evidence indicates R&D programs for both strategic delivery systems and nuclear warheads are continuing. If there is any intended change, it may be to increase the emphasis on the modernization of military forces in general, with strategic programs receiving their share of additional resources. Current Systems 14.“fS}~Same 30 CSS-1s and 40 CSS-2s, in conjunction with bombers, provide the PRC with a degree of strategic deterrence against the USSR. These same systems also give: the Chinese a limited tactical nuclear capability. 15.48) CSS-3. - This limited-range ICBM was initially tested in 1970. The first two ballistic flights were successful; the missile was also used twice as a space booster. After not being flown for five ears, the surface-to-surface mode during 197 16S It is difficult to explain the slow pace of this program and the limited deployment. It may be that the Chinese had originally intended not to deploy this limited-range system, but changed their minds when the tonger range CSS-X-4 program ran into trouble and the Soviet threat appeared paramount. 17.%S\.Looking to the future, the extent of additional CSS-3 deployment is uncertain, Alternatives include: - no additional deployment deployment at two more silos for a total of four -- deployment at a larger number of silos (10 or more} + deployment at soft sites. 7 —SECRE— 5 beatigs, mei (fe, Tesch? ne ae a ones . tad U. 5. S. R. f Mongolia = “ japan - . Pakistan his Repubtic ot China Pacific Ocean Slanke {Sieetem Maldives. °° a CSS 3 x... NEW SILOS FIGURE 5. CSS-3 DEPLOYMENTS (b)(1) ~ SEGREL__ 182™%S}.We believe extensive deployment of the CSS-3 is highly unlikely. There is an 80 percent probability that the system will be deployed only in limited numbers -- not more than four silos. There is apparently some training associated with the CSS-3, but if the Chinese intended to deploy the missile extensively before 1980, additional flight testing and silo construction should have occurred. We judge the probability of significant additional silo deployment to be low, about 20 percent; there is only a slight chance (10 percent) of soft site deployment. Additionally, the missile has not been used as a space launch vehicle since 1971, and its future use in this role is questionable. The CSS-X-4 has become China's main space booster. The CSS-3 appears to be a transient gap filler in the Chinese strategic plans.. The tradeoffs between the CSS-3 and future missiles now seem to favor new and improved systems. Future Systems CSS-X-4 ICBM {O-“SL CSS-X-4. a Prospects for this system are also cloudy. oul missile testing resume, we would expect several flights prior to [OC, probably including extended-range tests to an open ocean area. The earliest 1OC for the CSS-X-4 as an ICBM would be about 1980; a more likely |OC would be in the early 1980's, 20-S}.Since the majority of flights of this missile have been satellite launches, there is about a 90 percent chance that the Chinese have decided the system will be most useful at this time as a large space booster {designated the CSL-2}. Additionally, it is expected that three- and four-stage versions of the CSL-2 will be developed to support China's emerging space program. 21.“S!There is considerable —_ uncertainty “concerning the deployment of the CSS-X-4 as a strategic weapon system. With a maximum range capability of 13,000 km, the system would provide the Chinese with the capability to attack targets throughout the Soviet Union and the United States. Deployment alternatives include: ah: no deployment -___ deployment_at_a_f silos Range (km) 43,000 CEP (km) are Propeliant Storable Liquid -- deployment at a limited number (about Deployment Silo 15) of sifos FIGURE 6. - deployment at an extensive number (about 40) of silos. 9 “SEGRE HX (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(1) we doubt that the missile as tested to date will be deployed in any significant numbers. We believe that there is some chance that the system will not be deployed at all and only a 50 percent probability that the system will be deployed in more than a few silos. The chances are about even that the current CSS-X-4 will be modified or a follow-on system developed prior to any significant ICBM deployment. 23 ABI SSBN. ~ It is difficult to judge how tong it may take the Chinese to -resolve the apparent technical problems with the nuclear propulsion system for their submarines--if they have not already done so. We believe that the Chinese will remain committed to an SSBN/SLBM weapon system as a major part of their stratégic nuclear force in the decades ahead. Assurning most of the fundamental problems have been solved prior to launch, the first SSBN could be ready for operational deployment some three years after launch, 24. (3) SLBM. - We expect flight testing of an SLBM to begin during the next few years. This missile is projected to be a two-stage, solid-propellant design. In view of the apparent difficulties with solid propellants, an extended period of flight testing, perhaps some five years, is expected prior to JOC. At this time, it is difficult to judge whether the SSBN or the SLBM will be the pacing item in development of the integrated weapon system. On balance, there is about an 80 percent probability that the Chinese integrated SSBN/SLBM weapon system will reach {OC in the early to mid-1980's. SLBEM ’ Yield EP Ik Soe er F bid sae Sottt 25. ef We see a continuing investment in missile Beployment Submarine production and test facilities for both tiquid- and salid-propellant systems, There fs an expansion of missile test FIGURE 7, ranges with new R&D launeh sites under senstruetion. The nuelear warhead pregram eentinues active with new predustion facilities new eomplete. The Chinese nuclear foreas will not be linitad by nuelear materials far warheads in the forasagable future, All these Indleatore relnferee our view that the PRE will, aver the long-term, develap and dapley a viable strategie nuslear force that is capable of providing a deterrent against any potential adversary, ineluding the. United States, Range (km) a Long-Term Trends 26. Jef The types of strategic muelear forces China will ultimately develap and deploy ramains uncertain. In future decades, we believe they will mave mere taward land-mabile and sea-based systems. Hardened silos, while perhaps the only realistie option available threugh the early 18B0's, may be an unattractive basing mede for tha long-term. The Chinase realize that US and USSR technological advanees through the 1980's In warhead ylelds and system accuracies could result in a high eonfidence of destroying detectable harderied silos. 10 —SECRET— —SESRET— 27-87 Toward the end of the 1980's, fand-mobile strategic missiles may provide an attractive option in view of the large geographic areas available for deployment, It is doubtful that the Chinese can develop mobile liquid-propellant ICBMs, so they will need to advance in their solid-propellant program. 28.45) The Chinese will continue to pursue sea-based strategic missile systems, While technical difficulties may delay attainment of their first integrated SSBN/SLBM weapon system until well into the 1980's, improved follow-on systems that stress survivability as well as offensive capabilities can be expected. 29-487 We expect Chinese strategic nuclear forees to steadily expand their deterrent capability. What is essentia} for China is to increase the margin of uncertainty in the minds of a foreign leadership -- whether it be in Moscow, Washington, Tokyo, or New Delhi. Consequently, China's strategic nuclear force must continue, as it has sought to date, to stress survivability and flexibility. A mixed force would require some highly survivable SSBNs, land-based missiles with emphasis on semi-mobile or mobile rather than silo-based systems, and some aircraft. We doubt that the Chinese will develop long-range bombers, but we do project continuation of a medium-range bomber force of modest size. While Chinese nuclear forces will remain smaller and technologically inferior to those of the United States and the Soviet Union for at least the remainder of this century, improvements in the PRC's strategic nuclear forces will provide a more effective deterrent and increased international influence. 11 (Reverse Blank) —SEGREF- PRA