aa SE R-E. Ts Approved For Release 2001/09/04 :/CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030007-6 DCI Notes 9 Apr 79 VN~PRC-USSR~ KAMPUCHEA I, Retrospective on Chinese performance Te Signalled intent - especially their limited political objectives So doing skillfully controlled their risks Whether mil performance was restrained entirely because of 3 ‘limited objectives or because ineffectiveness also - unclear were sizeab ephinose lpsses “ Probably prepared Worthwhile from PRC viewpoint primarily because of i hae on. 7 of USER as Asian power; » V1 20 Saints 454 f7Qe Especially in ASEAN created impression Sov not ae in very meaningful manner in fulfilling commitment to VN; & in fact backed down before PRC challenge Even eee igures dg uncertain Te . does appear i o~accept . Chinese must view as net plus - primary objective 4. Secondary objective was to gesciie: betenouerse Kampuchea | Succeeded in short term at least . 30,000 VN troops withdrawn 5. Two downside impacts: a. Impression of an aggressive PRC embedded in some areas where counts - most particularly Japanx zg Q Must spill over to ASEAN also Though Thais.seem to be accommodating PRC very wel] me Sov-VN response , Can PRC "win" over Tong run II. Focus on Kampuchea 1. Most likely way for Sov/VN to attempt recoup from this setback would be to complete conquest of Kampuchea Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : C/A¢-RDP83B00100R000100030007-6 SEZRET SEQRET, Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : [A-RDP83B00100R000100030007-6 Paradox: (?) VN continued movement of forces to north - (Kam-VN Mil, 100-150,000 in Hanoi - border area now vice Forces Map) 70,000 in Dec. Including 3 div. units from Kampuchea (Y) But continued mobilization- - 25X1D Econ cost noted in PDB . Unclear what Pot Pot's status is. - ee Whether can hold out until rainy season - Bare May? - June/July ee ; VN effort clearly aimed at sealing border How resolute will Kriangsak be? ce Didn't give much in Moscow eae e. If VN really are successful - i.e. not stamp out guerrillas Day but turn into running sore that doesn't hobble rice planting ce economy in countryside & control of urban areas - oe -Rules out compromise solution -Replaces challenge of 25 Dec. before PRC ~ "s 2. -If is reasonably decisive resolution in Kampuchea in favor of VN - prong as ~Impact on PRC~VN talks adversely abe ~Could tempt PRC apply new pressures Renewed hostilities not out of? (Mil. Forces Along Still retain 400,000 troops Sino-VN Border Map) Apparently wanted to suck VN main force units into battle Approved For Release 2001/09/04 a -RDP83B00100R000100030007-6 NES NTRS RR i nn ha rman rani uel mercy talc de cna SE C/R ET 7 | | SECRET - Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000100030007-6 Only got a few Now have more Expensive in losses Would blame outbreak on VN 3. If stand off in Kampuchea - will make talks more meaningful i ee: ae ots Seems clear everyone thinking ‘of some compromise formula in _ Kampuchea Codlition gov't acceptable to both - or continue struggle in new way Sihanouk’s name always crops up .. we Have to separate from Beijing somehow Have get Sihanouk to play - _ Certainly not with Pol: Pot Another option - build on KCP But Pol Pot is the most effective leader Besides no practical way to get Pol Pot to step aside - If do, danger will be VN conquest. Looks like prolonged negotiation | Lots maneuvering behind scenes - ee Militarily in Kampuchea ve Pol Kamp, Hanoi, Beijing a III. Key factor will be direction of Sov-VN relationship © 1. Chinese policy seems to be to drive VN into greater dependence on Sovs tat Economic disruption tee Mil, needs - e.g. airlift =. PRC apparently believe/hope that such dependence will lead to tensions & resentments that will turn VN onto more balanced course between PRC & USSR One hand = Sovs probably more wary of becoming too identified with Hanoi's interests as did publicly with Way Friendship last Nov. - ; & then having their promises called in highly risky circumstance Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : CIA- RDP83B001 00R000100030007-6 { rr nn er or = — + woh Ww FN 1 af Approved For Release Ran 4/09/84) CA; ROREIBOR4OARPQOKIPOBIONTS port rights Even preliminary entry into Cam Rahn Bay is having perception impact in Far East Sovs never been delicate in such dealings - & Sovs recognize VN tough ally deal with IV. Soviet dilemmas ahag’,’ 1. Little choice other support VN - problem of how to contain the ie a commitment, to reasonable bounds where reputation not at stake oe i = =. beyond ability control events aye, ee Natural’ dvenue is to strengthen position Vis-a-vis Beijing 25x4D * Pigelianeens|) of a - i.e. Sino- pevist border eyes sco Approved For Release 2001/09/04: ClA-RDP83B00100R000100030007-6 oe SECRET Ee ' Approved For Release 2001/09/64E €14-RDP83B00100R000100030007-6 , 5. Fortunately both read other's signals properly - questions now: -How much more confidence does Deng feel - More or less cautionary as goes forward -~How concerned are Sovs at recouping any loss of image? -How much were Sovs. persuaded that PRC was supported by US ; & hence is there a permanent chance in balanced power in F..E.'sfrom Sov perspective?’ aces EMBER GS EB ee PE kD ot Bea ave more forces in position - a + . TOE Reece Lite gapaee . a maar ‘Both have larger commitment 7 * 7 sion & hostili Se Can negoti : rs